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The obj ecti ve of this research is to investigate the 
impact that Foreign Military Sales (FMS) policy can have on 
the preservation of the Defense Industrial Base. A survey 
is utilized to gather information from five of the top ten 
defense contractors. This study concludes that FMS policy 
will continue to be shaped by U. S. foreign policy. The 
study identifies how the defense industry has been affected 
by recent drawdowns and it describes arms transfers as an 
instrument of foreign policy based on United States national 
security interests. Additionally, offset agreements are 
analyzed as a contributory factor to the globalization of 
the arms industry. The study also identifies strategies the 
Government and the defense industry should use to facilitate 
the preservation of the Defense Industrial Base. The study 
recommends the Government review, streamline and liberalize 
arms transfer procedures. The Government can maintain the 
Defense Industrial Base by actively and aggressively 
supporting industry in the arms transfer process. 
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The purpose of this thesis is to examine the impact 
Foreign Military Sales (FMS) policy has on the preservation 
of the Defense Industrial Base. As United States (U. S. ) 
defense spending continues its downward spiral, the Pentagon 
is unable to fully support its military industrial complex. 
Today, FMS helps maintain the U. S. industrial base 
capabilities and, in some cases, may be the only purchases 
that keep u.S. weapons production facilities operating. 
Many feel that this is acceptable since the critical skills 
in the U.S. Defense Industrial Base must be preserved; with 
reduced defense dollars, FMS is the answer. 
B. BACKGROUND 
Global arms competition continues to demand weapons 
with advanced technological capabilities. The defense 
industry continues to meet this competition as individual 
contractors fight for arms contracts and market share. In 
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the past 15 years we have seen a shift in how we supply our 
allies due to reductions in domestic purchases. Defense 
firms actively seek business abroad in order to remain 
competitive in the global defense market. 
President Clinton's Conventional Arms Transfer Policy 
recognizes the importance of economic security by making it 
a policy goal to enhance the ability of the u. S. defense 
industrial base to meet U.S. defense requirements and 
maintain long-term military technological superiority at 
lower costs. The present policy offers few suggestions on 
how to accomplish this and it continues to stress a Cold-War 
security mentality. 
The importance of preserving the defense industrial 
base cannot be overstated. Without the capability to surge 
and supply American fighting forces, the U. S. could find 
itself in a perilous position. FMS is one program that may 
help maintain the U. S. defense industrial base and our 
country's technological superiority. The future security of 
the U.S. will depend on the ability of the defense 
industrial base to maintain its technological lead and 
production capacity. At present, the U. S. Government is 
doing little to help preserve that base. 
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C. THESIS OBJECTIVES 
The obj ecti ve of this research is to determine the 
effect current FMS policy has 
defense industrial base. It 
on the preservation of the 
discusses three areas in 
detail. First, it addresses the emergence of the u.s. as 
the world leader in arms exports and recommends that the 
U. S . Government maintain the defense industrial base by 
aggressively supporting the U. S. defense industry in the 
arms transfer process. With the end of the Cold War and the 
continuing drawdown of U.S. military forces and equipment, 
the defense industrial base is deteriorating. The 
Government must balance the current arms transfer decision 
making process with the welfare of the shrinking defense 
industry. 
Second, the impact of offsets are examined as they 
relate to employment, trade and globalization. The 
implications of offset agreements are discussed in the areas 
of defense preparedness, foreign dependence and technology 
transfer. 
Lastly, the concerns and recommendations of major u.S. 
defense industries are presented to outline their current 
posi tions in relation to FMS and the importance of FMS to 
their survival. 
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D. RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
1. Primary 
Does current FMS policy hinder or facilitate the 
preservation of the United States defense industrial base? 
2. Secondary 
• What is the purpose of FMS? 
• What current policies guide the conduct of FMS? 
• What has been the impact of post-Cold War u.S. 
drawdowns and changes in overall military strategy 
as it affects the defense industrial base? 
• What are the roles of offsets in FMS and how do 
offsets facilitate the preservation of the defense 
industrial base? 
• What are the curren t Governmen t and indus try 
concerns about FMS Policies as they relate to the 
defense industrial base? 
E. METHODOLOGY 
The methodology for research includes literature 
reviews and survey data from major defense firms (contract 
managers) . It reviews previous studies that have 
documented the impact of FMS on the defense industrial base. 
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The survey asks maj or defense firms how current FMS 
policy supports their preservation and requests input 
concerning future related policy. The analysis attempts 
to gather and present data showing how crucial FMS has 
become for the u.s. defense industrial base. 
Various documents and reports are reviewed in order to 
discuss the purpose of FMS and what impact current policy 
has in guiding the conduct of FMS cases. The recent u. S. 
defense drawdowns are analyzed and the role of offsets is 
discussed as they relate to the preservation of the defense 
industrial base. The surveys, along with a thorough 
analysis, identify key problems and recommendations for 
future policy as it relates to the preservation of the u.s. 
defense industrial base. 
F. ORGANIZATION 
Chapter II follows this introduction and establishes 
the background of security assistance as an element of 
foreign policy by examining its use by the u.s. from World 
War II to the present. It looks at four periods that 
demonstrate how U. S arms transfer policy has a regional 
focus. This chapter also examines the decision making 
process the President, the Department of State (DOS), the 
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Department of Defense (DOD), and other Government agencies 
use in controlling arms transfers. The impact of post-Cold 
War drawdowns on the defense industry is also discussed. 
Chapter III provides information on offset agreements 
and explains the different types of direct and indirect 
offset agreements. The impact of offsets on employment, 
trade and industrial competitiveness is discussed. The 
attitude within Government and the U. S. defense industry 
concerning offsets is also addressed. 
Chapter IV analyzes how the Government can preserve the 
defense industrial base. It synopsizes the applicable 
findings from major defense iqdustries and examines current 
policy implemented by the Clinton Administration. 
Chapter V discusses the conclusions that can be made 
based on the analysis and provides recommendations for 
future FMS and arms transfer policies. 
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II. FOREIGN MILITARY SALES OVERVIEW 
In the conduct of foreign relations, the United States, 
like every other state, is concerned primarily with the 
achievement of those obj ecti ves of national interest 
which it conceives to be of paramount significance. If 
the management of our external affairs is to enj oy 
rationality, it must have goals that harmonize with, 
and supplement, the internal policies and programs of 
the Government, whether they may be the promotion of 
commerce and trade, the acquisition of territory power,. 
or the maintenance of peace and security. 
President Truman 
These were the words spoken by President Truman during 
his 1949 inaugural speech and for the first time in U. S. 
history, an inaugural address devoted to the topic of 
foreign policy. His address initiated the development of 
several programs which we collectively call Security 
Assistance [Ref 7: p. 1J. 
The Security Assistance (SA) program is concerned with 
the transfer of military and economic assistance through the 
sale, grant, lease or loan to friendly foreign governments. 
The program is designed to enhance foreign policy objectives 
by contributing to national security through the concept of 
"collective security". Goals of the (SA) program include: 
• enhancing cooperative defense and security efforts 
• deterring and combating aggression 
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• promoting regional stability 
• promoting key interests through FMS cash sales and 
commercial military exports 
• promoting democratic values 
There are seven major components of the SA program. 
• Foreign Military Sales and Foreign Military 
Construction Sales Program 
• Foreign Military Financing Program 
• Commercial Sales licensed under the Arms Export 
Control Act (AECA) 
• Military Assistance Program (MAP) 
• International Military Education and Training (IMET) 
Program 
• Economic Support Fund 
• Peacekeeping Operations (PKO) 
This paper deals exclusively with FMS. FMS activities 
are legislated by the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 and the 
Arms Export Control Act of 1976. [Ref 8] The Truman 
Doctrine serves as the cornerstone for the development of 
the Foreign Assistance Act which provides the legal 
authori ty to provide goods and services to foreign 
governments which support u.S. national security objectives. 
[Ref 7: pp. 36-41] 
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A. FMS HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE 
Exporting u.s. military hardware to foreign governments 
is nothing new. President Franklin D. Roosevelt first 
offered u.s. military equipment to Britain through his 
"Destroyers for Bases Deal" in September 1940. Later that 
year he made provisions in his "Arsenal of Democracy" speech 
where the U.S. would furnish its allies with necessary 
supplies to include machinery and military equipment. This 
proposal became the cornerstone of Roosevelt's Lend-Lease 
Act. The Lend-Lease Act was authorized by Congress in 1941. 
It empowered the president to sell, lease or transfer such 
material under whatever terms the president deemed necessary 
and proper. By the end of World War II almost all allies, 
to include the Russians, were recipients under this Act. 
Lend-Lease continued as a u.s. foreign policy tool through 
September 1946 providing for the investment of $50.6 billion 
during the five-year program. [Ref 5: pp. 489-490] 
Today FMS as a foreign policy tool is not without its 
price. In 1993, Washington approved the shipment of $2.2 
billion in "free" weapons and military supplies to some 50 
countries. Many of these "gi ve-aways" were to countries 
whose security interests are rooted in the Cold War or for 
participation in the Persian Gulf War. [Ref 6: p. 26] 
Section 516 of the Foreign Assistance Act authorizes the 
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grant transfer of lethal excess defense articles and 
services: 1) to those members of the North Atlantic Treaty 
Organization (NATO) on the southern flank of NATO, 2) to 
maj or non-NATO nations on the southern and southwestern 
flank of NATO, and 3) to those countries which contributed 
armed forces to deter Iraqi aggression in the Arabian Gulf. 
This section, as originally written, was intended to 
reinforce the weak southern flank 'of NATO in the early 
1960's. Over the years, Section 516 has become a "catch-
all" to reward countries for their favorable support of u.s. 
interests within a region. Other sections within the 
Foreign Assistance Act that grant u. S·. military equipment to 
friendly nations include Section 517- The Transfer of Lethal 
Excess Defense Articles for the modernization of counter 
narcotics capabilities o·f certain countries, Section 518-
The Transfer of Non-Lethal Excess Defense Articles for the 
Protection of Natural Resources and Wildlife Management, and 
Section 519- The Transfer of Non-Lethal Excess Defense 
Articles to help modernize the defense capabilities of 
friendly countries. [Ref 12: pp 198-204] The total 
expenditures in 1997 for Department of Defense (DOD) FMS is 


















TABLE 1: DOD FOREIGN MILITARY SALES 
DOD Foreign Military Sales 1997 
Parent Company Amount 
McDonnell Doug. Corp. $5,532,029 
Lockheed Martin $2,450,661 
General Motors $946,217 
United Technologies $663,571 
Raytheon Co. . $457,502 
Boeing Co. $401,411 
FMC Corp. $192,946 
General Ele. Co. $172,344 
Northrop Grumman Corp. $141,985 
General Dynamics Corp. $133,888 
Canadian Comm. Corp. $124,567 
Science Appl. IntI. $102,843 
BDM Corp. $89,370 
Salomon Inc. $65,976 

















**Rankings are based on prime contracts of $25,000 or more 
R&D, services and products sold to non-U.S. governments. 
(Source: Government Executive, September 1997) 
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B. ARMS TRANSFERS SINCE 1945 
1. NATO Rear.mament, 1945-1960 
Aid during the onset of the Cold War began with Greece 
and Turkey in 1946 and in Western Europe in 1948. [Ref 10: 
p. 4] The Mutual Defense Assistance Program had been 
authorized by Congress and intended to accomplish arms 
transfers on a grant basis for the NATO allies of the U.S. 
The goal of this program was to strengthen NATO military 
forces without requiring NATO countries to delay or abandon 
economic recovery efforts that had been established under 
the Marshal Plan. 
This program was in line with the Joint Strategic 
Operations Plan (JSOP), a policy used extensively in the 
1950' sand 1960' s. The JSOP outlined planning documents 
that related military requirements to capabilities. It 
described the military threat as the "Soviet Bloc" and 
listed the capabilities of the U.s. and NATO allies to meet 
tha t threat. The document also listed what each country 
could do when it received U.s. arms in order to augment U.S. 
forces in theater. Essentially, the JSOP justified the 
transfer of arms to NATO allies so that both NATO and the 
u.S. would be able to meet a Soviet conventional threat. 
The method of deciding who received arms sales, and 
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what equipment and services they should get, continued to be 
the focus of the Truman, Eisenhower, and Kennedy 
Administrations. Beginning in 1950, the DOD began tracking 
arms sales and deliveries on a fiscal basis. Those data are 
now available and updated by the Defense Security 
Assistance Agency (DSAA). [Ref 10: pp. 4-5] 
2. Vietnam Era, 1960-1973 
The Vietnam era occurred during the Kennedy, Johnson, 
and Nixon Administrations. During this period the security 
assistance community developed two separate programs, the 
Military Assistance Services Fund (MASF) and the Excess 
Military Assistance Service Fund (EXMASF), to specifically 
'handle the Vietnam War. Although other security assistance 
programs were implemented, these two programs rapidly 
developed in order to quickly transfer arms to those nations 
involved in Vietnam. Between FY 1965 and FY 1975, the 
countries of Korea, Laos, Philippines, Thailand and Vietnam 
received equipment and services valued at more than $18 
billion. u.S. interests were highly focused on this region 
of the world. The containment of Communism was still at the 
forefront of strategic thought. Though Europe was still 
receiving arms transfers to keep NATO strong, East Asia and 
the Pacific region became more significant to both military 
and political leaders. [Ref 10: pp. 6-7] 
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3. The Middle East Era, 1973-1989 
The Near East and Southern Asia did not receive 
equipment or services in the form of security assistance 
until the 1973 Arab/Israeli war. Deliveries were below $500 
million From FY 1966 to FY 1970 but rapidly increased by 
1974. From FY 1974 to FY 1980 FMS deliveries ranged between 
$2 billion and $5 billion. A unique feature of this period 
was the inception of commercial sales as a part of security 
assistance. Until 1970, arms transferred from the U.S. were 
only in the form of government-to-government sales or 
grants. In FY 1971, however, U.S. commercial firms applied 
for and acquired the necessary licenses to negotiate 
directly with defense industries or ministries of other 
countries. In the first five years of this program 
commercial sales ranged between $500 and $900 million. 
Another unique feature of this period was the relationship 
developed by the U. S. and Israel. Al though FMS was the 
primary vehicle for most transfers to the Near East, one of 
the largest recipients of U.S. military equipment and 
services, Israel, also received over $16 billion in foreign 
military financing (FMF) waivers, finance guarantees or 
direct waivers. These " special programs" for Israel are 
tied to foreign policy interests of the U.S. in that region 
and continue today. [Ref 10: pp. 8-10] 
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4. Post Cold-War Period, 1989-1992 
This period reflects the uncertainty of the post Cold-
War world. The U.S. continued to transition from a 
bipolar-focused foreign policy to a more flexible one based 
on regional stability and U.S. values. In the name of 
controlling Soviet expansionism, the U.S. was able to 
negotiate arms transfers to any country it desired. At the 
end of the Cold War, the U.S. developed a two Major Regional 
Conflict (MRC) strategy in order to focus both foreign and 
military policy. [Ref 10:pp. 10-11] President Clinton's 
National Security Strategy would now focus on the perceived 
threats of North Korea, Iran and Iraq. 
C. FUTURE FMS GUIDANCE 
In early 1994, the Clinton Administration submitted to 
Congress a draft bill intended to replace the Foreign 
Assistance Act cited as H.R. 3765 "The Peace, Prosperity and 
Democracy Act of 1994". The overriding theme of this 
legislation is the promotion of democracy in Eastern Europe 
and the former Soviet Union through our national strategy of 
enlargement. This document was meant to incorporate the 
changes that were seen in the world and provide the 
framework for future assistance to the former Warsaw Pact 
countries. The importance of alliances and coalitions 
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remains evident given the language in Sections 3301 and 3302 
of the bill: 
In order to stem incipient regional conflicts 
worldwide, the United States sees great value in 
maintaining alliances, coalitions and other 
cooperative defense relationships that permit more 
effective collective defense efforts. The United 
States will provide assistance to enhance the 
ability of countries world wide willing to share 
the burden of contributing to regional alliances, 
coalition operations, and other collective 
security efforts to counter threats to and 
maintain international peace and security. 
-The Peace, Prosperity, and Democracy Act of 1994, 
Sections 3301 and 3302 
As of October 1994, this bill was stalled within the 
Senate Foreign Relations Committee and the House Foreign 
Affairs Committee. As an interim measure, Congress rushed 
through an amendment in November of 1994 which was entitled 
"The NATO Participation Act of 1994". This document was 
intended to assist in the transition to full NATO membership 
the countries of Poland, Hungary, the Czech Republic and 
Slovakia. [Ref 8:pp. 1-3] 
The White House did release on February 17, 1995, the 
new United States Government Conventional Arms Transfer 
Policy. This policy outlines the following goals for future 
arms sales: fi'rst, to ensure that our military forces can 
continue to enjoy technological advantages over potential 
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adversaries; second, to help allies deter or defend 
themselves against aggression; third, to promote regional 
stability in areas critical to u.s. interests, while 
preventing the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction 
and their missile delivery systems; fourth, to promote 
peaceful conflict resolution and arms control, human rights, 
democratization and other u. s. foreign policy objectives; 
and fifth, to enhance the ability of the U.S. defense 
industrial base to meet u.s. defense requirements and 
maintain long-term military technological superiority at 
lower costs. With regards to the last point, once an 
approval for transfer is made, the u.s. will take steps in 
tasking our overseas personnel (security assistance 
officers) to support overseas marketing efforts of American 
companies bidding on defense contracts. This policy _also 
calls for actively involving senior Government officials in 
promoting sales of particular importance in the U. S. [Ref 
30: pp . 54 - 5 6] 
D. LABYRINTH OF CONTROL 
It is the sense of the Congress that the President 
should maintain adherence to a policy of restraint 
in conventional arms transfers. American policy 
is to encourage regional arms control and 
disarmament agreements and to discourage arms 
races. 
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-Arms Export Control Act of 1976, Section 1 
Many fear that U.S. arms transfer policy lacks control 
and allows valuable military technologies to quickly end up 
in foreign hands. In reality, the control measures 
established by public law, presidential policy, 
congressional actions, and the U.S. military establishment 
might be more comprehensive than they appear and even can be 
excessive at times. There is a labyrinth of controls on 
conventional arms transfers. 
In 1983, Dr. Michael D. Salomone published a book 
titled The Reluctant Supplier. In that book he describes 
six functions of arms sales decisionmaking that remain valid 
today. They are: (1) recognition of a recipient's needs and 
wants; (2) initial review of a government' s request for 
information; (3) policy review of a purchase request; (4) 
negotiation and development of an agreement; (5) execution 
of an agreement; and (6) feedback and evaluation concerning 
the recipient's use of the assistance received. From the 
identification of the need or want to the actual delivery of 
a weapon system, an elaborate and complex arms transfer 
approval process exists within the Executive and Legislative 
branches of the Government. [Ref 21: p.85] 
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It is relevant to note that all public laws and 
policies guiding the arms transfer process were written 
during the Cold War. The Arms Export Control Act (AECA) of 
1976 and the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, as amended, 
allow the President to delegate the authority for arms 
transfer policy to the Department of State (DOS). In order 
to sell arms abroad, u.S. defense firms require a munitions 
license. This license can only be granted by the State 
Department. Under the AECA, U.S. firms and Military 
Services are prohibited from marketing U.S. arms to foreign 
governments or industries unless that government 
specifically requests information on a purchase. These laws 
all push for a "policy of restraint in arms transfers" and 
"encourage regional arms control while discouraging arms 
races." [Ref 21: pp.86-88] 
Many individuals are involved in the six basic 
decisionmaking functions of security assistance. Together 
these personnel constitute a system the U.S. Government 
employs to manage this complex problem. It should be 
recognized that the system is dynamic and changes with each 
request depending on the equipment or service requested, 
which coup-try is doing the requesting, and what level of 
political attention that request mayor may not be getting. 
It is, however, a process that can be understood. 
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The principal U. S. field personnel in countries that 
make requests for information on the purchase of military 
equipment are ambassadors and their political counselors, 
defense attaches and security assistance officers. In 
addition, industries may send specialists to provide advice 
or temporary services. At the regional level, security 
assistance staffs at the Unified Commands monitor and 
support country security assistance teams. 
Within the DOS, a number of officials are involved in 
arms transfers. The Secretary of State supervises and 
provides general direction over foreign assistance issues 
and determines if there will be a program and, if so, its 
size, scope, and when it can take place. The primary 
contacts within the DOS for arms transfer issues rests with 
the offices of the Assistant Secretary of State for 
Political-Military Affairs and the Under Secretary of State 
for International Security Affairs (ISA). [Ref 24:pp. 84-91] 
The primary day-to-day agency that works on security 
assistance and arms transfers within the Political-Military 
Affairs branch are the Office of Defense Relations and 
Security Assistance, which approves and monitors all 
government-to-government sales, and the Office of Defense 
Trade Controls, which is responsible for granting U.S. 
industries munitions licenses before any transfer can be 
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approved. None of these agencies make decisions alone or in 
the dark; they frequently request specific studies and 
analysis from the many regional desks within the State 
Department. These regional bureaus may, in turn, request an 
opinion from their security assistance officer or ambassador 
within the requesting country. 
The maj ori ty of "players" in the arms transfer arena 
are in DOD. Although DOD's role. is as executor and. 
implementor of State Department policy, that role is not 
insignificant. The Secretary of Defense sometimes meets 
with the President and the Secretary of State over security 
assistance matters. More immediate policy decisions are 
generally made by· the Assistant Secretary of Defense for 
International Security Affairs (ISA). The ISA office is 
broken down into regional offices and desks which consider 
the political and military implications of proposed arms 
transfers. 
The primary agency within DOD for directing and 
supervising the execution of security assistance programs is 
the Defense Security Assistance Agency (DSAA). The DSAA is 
the focal point for all communications within DOD regarding 
government-to-government arms transfers. Commercial sales 
are handled by the Office of Defense Trade Controls in the 
State Department. However, if a maj or weapon system is 
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requested through commercial channels, the DOS will ask for 
DOD advice in regards to the ramification of that sale. If 
a technology assessment is required, the Defense Technology 
Security Administration (DTSA) will make a determination of 
whether or not advanced technologies are being risked by the 
sale or transfer of that system. DTSA performs this for 
both commercial or government-to-government transfers. 
The individual Services--Army, Navy, and Air Force--
have their own security assistance divisions. The Army has 
the u.S. Army Security Assistance Command (USASAC), the Navy 
has its International Programs Office (IPO), and the Air 
Force has its International Affairs Directorate under the 
Secretary of the Air Force (SAF IIA) . Each Security 
Assistance Division works within its own Service as the 
primary point of contact for certain weapon systems. For 
example, if a tank is requested for purchase, the USASAC 
will be asked to assess the ramifications of that sale. 
Missiles are under the auspices of the Navy, so the Navy IPO 
would become the lead agent to support or advise on that 
transfer. The request for information or purchase of an F-
16 or F-15 would fall under the auspices of SAF/IA. 
Although the DOD and DOS are the primary stakeholders 
in most arms transfers, there are many other agencies that 
may become involved. The Treasury Department, the Central 
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Intelligence Agency (CIA) and the Office of Management and 
Budget (OMB) are less directly involved, but can play an 
important role. The General Accounting Office (GAO) 
frequently reviews the process, as do the staffs of the 
House and Senate Armed Services Committees. In some 
poli tically sensi ti ve cases, the President or the Congress 
may take a central role in the arms transfer process. [Ref 
24 : pp. 88- 91] 
E. IMPACT OF POST-COLD WAR DRAWDOWNS ON THE 
DEFENSE INDUSTRY 
DOD has experienced a reduced world threat and a 
declining budget since a peak in the middle 1980' s. This 
declining budget has had a tremendous affect on the ability 
of the Defense Department to maintain programs and enter 
into new procurements. The inability to produce new 
contracts, along with reduced dollars for existing programs 
has greatly influenced major defense firms. 
Since its peak in the middle 1980' s, DOD has been 
downsizing by end strength and dollars budgeted by Congress. 
Since fiscal year 1985, budget authority for national 
defense has been cut significantly. In 1991, for example, 
national defense budget authority was 20 percent below the 
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1985 peak after an adjustment for inflation. As a percent 
of GNP, national defense outlays over the next several years 
(FY 1993--FY 1998) will fall below the Vietnam drawdown 
percentages of the 1970's. 
The defense cuts are forecast to be even greater in the 
future. Table 2 shows, in current year dollars, the 
projected budget for FY 1993 through FY 1998 in budget 
authority and outlays. The U.S. Government has decided to 
continue further reductions in our national defense. 
Current political statements' transmitted via media seem to 
suggest that reductions beyond those currently identified by 
the Clinton Administration would be hazardous to the 
"military base force" (basic national defense with present 
manning levels). These arguments are continually debated in 
Congress and the outcome is uncertain. [Ref 20: pp. "5-11] 
Also depicted in Table 2, it is evident that the level 
of defense funding available for new and existing contracts 
is decreasing. Major defense contractors are receiving 
fewer and fewer DOD contract dollars because of reduced 
funds, program cancellations and a reduced number of new 
procurements. Bottom-line: changes in funding are equal to 
changes in the defense industrial base. [Ref 26: pp.5-8] 
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TABLE 2: NATIONAL DEFENSE TOPLINE(CURRENT $ BILLIONS) 
BUDGET AUTHORITY 
DOD MILITARY 
DOE & OTHER 
TOTAL NATL DEFENSE 
REAL CHANGE (%) 
OUTLAYS 
DOD MILITARY 
DOE & OTHER 
TOTAL NATL DEFENSE 
REAL CHANGE (%) 
1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 
259.1 250.7 24B.1 240.3 232.B 240.5 
13.9 12.7 13.0 13.4 13.2 13.4 
273.0 263.4 261.1 253.7 246.0 253.9 
-8.5 -5.0 -3.0 -5.1 -5.0 0 
277.3 264.2 25B.0 251.6 233.7 239.2 
13.4 12.7 12.9 13.1 13.2 13.3 
290.7 276.9 270.9 264.7 246.9 252.5 
-5.6 -6.6 ~4.3 -4.5 -B.9 0 
(SOURCE: FY 1994 DEFENSE BUDGET BEGINS NEW ERA, MARCH 27, 1993.) 
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F. SUMMARY 
This chapter indicates that U.S arms transfers are used 
as an instrument of foreign policy based on U. S. security 
interests. These interests are decided upon by the 
presidents and their administrations as they react to the 
foreign policy changes of the day. 
This chapter also provides an appreciation for the 
amount of control present 
decisionmaking process. As 
through the many stakeholders 
in the arms trans"fer 
decisions weave their way 
in the DOS, DOD and other 
Governmental agencies, it is like a labyrinth of control. 
This labyrinth of controls is more than adequate to prevent 
unwanted diffusion of military technologies. 
Lastly, this chapter provides the reader with an 
understanding of the size, extent, and timeframe of the 
defense downsizing. As downsizing continues, Congress must 
keep the pressure on to maintain maj or defense industry 
contracting goals. The following chapter addresses the 
possibility of loosening these controls in order to 
instigate more foreign military sales. Additional FMS may 
have the potential to "offset" the U.S. defense budget and 
favorably impact the U.S. Defense Industrial Base. 
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III. POLITICAL & ECONOMIC IMPACT OF 
OFFSETS 
Chapter III defines and provides examples of offset 
agreements and discusses how offset agreements of the past 
have contributed to the globalization of the U.S. arms 
industry. 
A. OVERVIEW OF OFFSETS 
The term offset lacks a uniform definition and 
different terms are used by Government agencies and business 
entities to describe the concept. This research thesis uses 
the term offsets to refer to trade arrangements. These 
trade arrangements include a myriad of compensation 
practices required by a foreign purchasing government as a 
condition attached to the sale of defense articles or 
services. The intent of these arrangements is to decrease 
the impact of expensive weapon systems on the buyer's 
balance of payments and to provide the buyer with other 
advantages. These other advantages often take the shape of 
increased employment, expansion of their industrial base or 
the enhancement of technology transfer. [Ref 19:pp. 185-187] 
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Arms sales offsets come in two forms. A direct offset 
involves the transfer of military technology, usually by 
granting a license to the receiving country to manufacture a 
u. S. weapon system, its components or subcomponents. An 
indirect offset would involve counter-importing some random 
product into the arms selling country or transferring 
commercial technology; it is not directly military related. 
A good example of a direct offset is seen in the $5.2· 
billion Korean Fighter Program (KFP) deal in 1991. South 
Korea purchased twelve F-16C/D fighters from General 
Dynamics (subsequently purchased by Lockheed), as well as 36 
aircraft "kits" to be assembled in Korea. South Korea, 
however, desired to produce an indigenous fighter aircraft 
and held out for the right to manufacture an additional 72 
F-16s under license. It .was later proven that Korean Air 
Lines and Daewoo Heavy Industries had already produced some 
F-16 parts and Samsung Ae~ospace had produced parts for th~ 
F/A-18 strike fighter. This manufacturing capability was 
later learned to be "nothing" compared to the level of 
manufacturing and production line management contemplated 
under the KFP. According to the General Accounting Office 
(GAO), on top of the transfer of manufacturing and assembly 
know-how, Korea received approximately 30% of the contract 
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value, more than $1.5 billion, in undisclosed indirect 
offsets. [Ref 18:pp. 1-3] 
The 1982 $1.8 billion sale of F/A-18 strike fighters to 
Spain exemplifies an indirect offset. As a part of this 
agreement, McDonnell Douglas Corporation offered $1.5 
billion in "assistance" (offsets). The aerospace company 
agreed to market a wide range of Spanish products in the 
United States to include steel coils, chemicals, sunflower 
seed oil, sailboats, paper products, zinc and marble. The 
corporation helped publish and distribute a picture book on 
Spanish lifestyles designed to promote U.S. tourism in 
Spain. In addition, McDonnell Douglas helped establish a 
Domino's Pizza franchise in Barcelona. [Ref 18:pp 1-2] 
Since 1985, almost all FMS weapons sales have involved 
economic offsets of some kind to the purchasing entity. The 
decision whether to engage in offsets and the responsibility 
for negotiating and implementing offset arrangements 
resides with the defense firm involved. The U.S. Government 
is restricted under the 1989 National Defense Authorization 
Act from encouraging foreign nations not to demand offsets 
as part of an arms contract. 
Even though the terms of an offset agreement on 
individual contracts may vary, they can be grouped into one 
of the following types: 
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• Coproduction has been a major area of increase since the 
mid-1980's. Coproduction involves a joint manufacturing 
venture between a U. s. defense company and the 
Under coproduction, participating foreign country. 
participating nations are authorized to produce portions 
of the product, but are not entitled to have access to 
cri tical manufacturing processes or technologies. The 
F-16 fighter represents the largest coproduction activity 
in this century and includes the four Western European 
countries of Belgium, Denmark, Norway and the 
Netherlands. Coproduction can lock foreign governments 
into business arrangements for several decades, from 
"cradle to grave". This facet of coproduction provides 
three advantages for the U.s. defense companies. First, 
it bolsters other market sales as foreign governments 
have confidence in a product bought by many countries. 
Second, the years of defense interaction with 
participating governments establishes 
that can assist in future sales 
"diplomatic ties" 
and/ or mutually 
beneficial arrangements. And finally, coproduction 





costs with guaranteed 
• Codevelopmen t entails cooperation from the concept 





also creates cost and benefit-sharing 
weapon system's life-cycle. In 
codevelopment programs, governments or multinational 
corporate teams work together to jointly develop and 
manufacture weapon systems. Codevelopment methods of 
procurement are more prevalent in Europe than they are in 
the U.S., mainly due to the extended program length and 
management difficulties of the U. S . acquisition system. 
Today, with the increasing costs of Research and 
Development (R&D), many European countries prefer to 
participate in codevelopment ventures with the U. S. [Ref 
l:pp 175-180] 
• Two other categories of offsets include the requirement 
to license produce an item or the requirement for 
technology transfer. Licensed production involves 
overseas production of u.s. defense equipment based upon 
transfer of technical information under direct commercial 
arrangements between aU. S. manufacturer and a foreign 
government or producer. The requirement to license 
produce usually stems from the desire to be totally 
independent or the need to create jobs within your own 
country. License production is usually more . expensive 
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than purchasing the final product from the manufacturer, 
but in some nations it is preferred because it provides 
both jobs and technology transfer. Technology transfer 
may take the form of R&D, technical assistance or other 
activities under a direct commercial arrangement between 
the U. S. manufacturer and foreign purchaser. [Ref 1: pp 
185-187] 
Industry finds it preferable to sell outright without 
obligations to share production, technology transfer or 
committing to purchase from a buyer. Research, however, has 
shown that U.S. contractors are willing to enter into offset 
arrangements because they are necessary to stay competitive. 
'One Sikorsky spokesman put it simply by stating, "Sixty 
percent of something is better than 100% of nothing." [Ref 
23:pp 64-67] 
On the other hand,' when you look at a buyer's position, 
offsets become very attractive. As previously discussed, 
offsets provide the buyer with production know how, 
increased employment and a way to reduce the impact of 
expensive weapons purchases. One drawback that a buyer must 
face, however, is that the per unit cost of a weapon system 
is usually higher with offsets than without them. Many 
countries today would rather coproduce than buy some defense 
items off the shelf. 
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B. OFFSETS AND GLOBILIZATION 
Much of the globalization trend in the U. s. defense 
industry has occurred since the mid 1980's and has been due 
in part to the cooperation and offsets by the U. s. u.s. 
assistance to Europe following World War II has led to their 
emergence as a significant force wi thin the arms market. 
Wi th a cornmon goal of defending against Soviet aggression 
and expansion, the U.S. emphasized the military advantage of 
cooperation and NATO. In DOD's view, by eliminating 
duplication and competition in the development, production 
and procurement of weapon systems, NATO .would not only be 
more capable but more efficient, saving money while 
deploying a more effective fighting force. [Ref 28: pp. 1-5] 
This viewpoint is predicated on the fact that duplication 
and competition can be eiiminated in Western Europe, since 
the U. S. is already producing American weapon systems for 
U. S. forces which represent the latest in military 
technology. The European members of NATO focus on the 
economic and political importance; Western Europe stresses 
the benefits of jobs, development of their R&D base, and 
export sales arising from arms production. [Ref 1: pp. 180-
182] 
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This differing viewpoint was the impetus for increased 
offset requirements for U. S. systems not only among NATO 
members but also Canada, Japan and many countries in the 









international subcontracting, licensed production, co-
development and co-production of major weapon systems. The 
increase in offset arrangements in the mid to early 1980's 
coincided with this globalization trend. (Table 3) 
As previously discussed, the catalyst that initiated 
the increase in cooperation between allies and friendly 
nations was the emergence of the Soviet Union following 
World War II and the NATO alliance that formed to deter the 
corresponding threat. Increasingly, NATO countries invest 
in their own indigenous arms production capabilities; 
however, rationalization, standardization and 
interoperabili ty (RSI) requirements between their systems 
and their allies' systems increased the number of 
cooperative programs. Ironically, it was the fall of the 
Soviet Union and the dissolution of the Warsaw Pact that 
provided the next push towards 
integration of the arms market. 
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the global economic 
TABLE 3: OFFSET OBLIGATIONS UNDERTAKEN BY U.S. ARMS 
MANUFACTURERS DURING 1980-1987 



















Peoples Rep of China 29.8 
Rep of Korea 46.2 
Saudi Arabia 29.9 
Spain 132.5 (Source: OMB 1994) 
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The end of the Cold War led many governments to make 
substantial reductions in defense spending. This, along 
with increasing research and development and production 
costs associated with future weapon systems, has caused 
fewer new weapon systems to be produced and existing systems 
to be procured in smaller numbers. 
As U.S. defense industries are confronted with a 
shrinking defense market and excess production capacity, 
they are looking for FMS to counter lost revenue. DOD 
openly admits it cannot fully support the U.S. defense 
industrial base and exports are expected to comprise about 
25 percent of the defense contractors' revenue in the 
future. [Ref 27: pp.1-2] 
While no Government figures are available that account 
for the value of the associated offset agreements, past 
experience indicates that they are a necessity to conduct 
business. The sale of F-16s and Bradley Fighting Vehicles 
to Turkey in 1992 required Lockheed Martin to produce 
portions of these weapon systems in Turkey. [Ref 30: p. 21] 
To illustrate how offset agreements contribute to the 
globalization of the arms market, the following major sale 




C. AWACS CASE STUDY 
AWACS sales to Britain in early 1987 involved offsets 
of 130% of the sales contract value. Boeing served as the 
prime contractor in this case and offsets of this magnitude 
were a forerunner of others to come. 
Boeing originally submitted a offset bid of 35% of the 
contract value when Britain initially 





1986. In September of the same year Britain selected two of 
the seven bidders as semi-finalists: GEC Nimrod and Boeing 
AWACS. The firms were chosen as the semi-finalists because 
they both demonstrated the capabilities required and they 
met the risk, cost and timeliness evaluation criteria. 
In late 1986, Boeing and its subcontractors 
(Westinghouse, GE and SNECMA) increased the offsets proposal 
to 130% of the contract value. Boeing had established 
participation agreements with three British avionics 
companies and these corporations openly supported AWACS over 
Nimrod. These "agreements" were vague, but they simply 
stated the intent to cooperate in any offsets that might 
result if AWACS was selected. The fact that three of 
Britain's largest aerospace firms favored AWACS played an 
important role in the final selection process. 
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In December of 1986, the Ministry of Defense announced 
the contract award to the Boeing AWACS. Many British firms 
protested the result, especially GEC. They claimed that 
they would lose over 2,500 prime and subcontractor jobs plus 
the future export market for airborne early warning systems. 
The British Minister of Defense promptly defended the AWACS 
award and claimed that gains for other firms would equal or 
exceed losses by GEC. The British Government repeatedly 
claimed that the decision was based solely on the proven 
capabilities of AWACS and ,how it met their defense 
requirements. The total costs of AWACS would be $12 billion 
for seven aircraft plus an option for an additional plane. 
In February 1987, the formal contract was signed and it 
included the following offset agreements. 
• All offsets were to be fulfilled over an eight _year 
period. If not met within that timeframe Boeing and 
its subcontractors would continue to apply offsets 
until 130% was reached. 
• Only 10% of the offsets would be directly related to 
the AWACS program. All other offsets would be 
indirect in high technology defense and aerospace 
products. 
• Boeing was required to report the status of offset 
fulfillment semi-annually. 
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• All bids by British firms to the u. S. prime and 
subcontractors would be evaluated "competitively" 
among all bidders. Final awards to British 
companies would be counted toward the offset. 
The offsets would be shared by Boeing's eleven maj or 
subcontractors which included Westinghouse, IBM, Northrop, 
Hughes and Siemens of West Germany (Table 4: Major 
Subcontractors & Their Component Contribution). Each 
subcontractor would be required to take on a percentage, 
based roughly on the "percentage of value" that they would 
contribute to the AWACS. Boeing expected to meet most of 
its share of indirect offsets by purchasing British-made 
equipment such as Rolls Royce engines and other aerospace· 
related items. 
The direct offsets associated with the British AWACS 
·purchase were significant because they had immediate 
implications on u.S. industries. Siemens (West Germany) was 
required to subcontract with Racal (British avionics 
company) for the displays and controls for AWACS. 
Hazel tine, aU. S. firm, had previously manufactured these 
parts for AWACS. This move was defended because Hazeltine 
was not in a position to absorb the required offsets. 
Another benefit which British companies indirectly received 
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TABLE 4: BOEING'S MAJOR SUBCONTRACTORS & THEIR 
COMPONENT CONTRIBUTION 
Subcontractor 





















(Source: Third Annual Report on the Impact of Offsets 
in Defense-Related Exports~ 1987 pp 5-6) 
40 
through the offsets was access to Boeing's worldwide 
marketing networks. Due to the relatively small size of 
British industry and its dependence on exports for growth, 
the position of several u.s. competitors including 
Westinghouse was weakened in the global market. 
This arrangement also created the potential for 
technology transfers from the U.S. to Britain. It was 
feared that Britain's participation in the developmen"t for 
the next-generation AWACS might lead to further displacement 
of U.S. suppliers. Luckily for the U.S., the U.S. Air Force 
was also an AWACS "customer" and has continued to rely on 
AWACS. The strong U.S. commitment to AWACS has ensured a 
strong market for U. S. suppliers for years to come. [Ref 
2 :pp. 5-14] 
The sale of the AWACS illustrates how the U. S. has 
aided its allies in developing their domestic industrial 
capabilities in defense and non-defense sectors. The 
sharing of a common objective to provide security to the 
European continent superseded the consequences of the offset 
to the U.S. industrial base. Given the environment of the 
time, with the ongoing Cold War and arms sales relatively 
high compared with today, having the increased competition 
was not particularly threatening to U.S. industrial 
competitiveness. 
41 
However, if we extend the above mentioned "concessions" 
into the present, with 




that the u.s. 
provided to its allies and friends in the past could have 
significant consequences in the future. The threat is not 
at the system level, where the u.s. remains the leader, but 
rather at the component and subassembly level where many of 
the offset agreements have been focused. The threat is not 
that another country will develop a fighter or main battle 
tank that can compete with aU. S. design, but rather that 
the wings for that fighter or electronics for that tank may 
be dominated by a foreign manufacturer whose initial start 
in that sector was provided by offsets in the past. [Ref 31:· 
pp. 65-67] 
These implications are the concern for the future and 
the symptoms of the globalization trend. To remain 
competitive and solvent in the long term, the U.S. defense 
firm must rely heavily on export sales and establish long 
term relationships with foreign contractors. [Ref 31: p. 67] 
D. INDUSTRIAL COMPETITIVENESS 
The measur.e of success U. S. defense industries have had 
in light of offsets has been favorable. The positive 
defense trade balance between the U. S. and its trading 
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"customersU is indicative of the benefits flowing into the 
u. s. as a result of military exports influenced by offset 
agreements. 
Offset agreements have played a maj or role i"n 
transferring technology and American know-how to foreign 
companies who now actively compete with u.s. defense firms 
for market share. In the Boeing sale of AWACS to Great 
Bri tain, it ultimately proved beneficial to contribute to 
Britain's aerospace and electronic firms. The resulting 
teaming of Westinghouse and the British firm Plessey in 
fiber optics and electronics will increase the level of 
competition in that market. The increased competition 
should lead to reduced prices and an overall increase in 
quality. [Ref 1: pp. 175-177J 
The reduction in the overall number of U. S. defense 
firms is not entirely "attributable to offsets. The recent 
drawdowns in defense spending and the need for increased 
cooperation across national lines could continue to "weed-
out" non-competitive firms. The future will likely see 
mega-mergers between defense corporations as firms continue 
to specialize in specific products. Lockheed Martin and 
Boeing/McDonnell Douglas should continue to dominate the 
aerospace industry, maintaining relationships with British 
Aerospace and Matra of France to support export business. 
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These relationships will likely continue to be necessary to 
maintain access to foreign markets . and technologies. [Ref 
25: pp. 5-7] 
U . S. defense firms must also safeguard against giving 
the technology farm away. The future viability and 
competitiveness of the U.S. defense industrial base will be 
based upon being able to remain the world leader in military 
research and development, to include both military specific 
R&D, and other capabilities derived from commercial R&D with 
military applications. [Ref 16: pp. 12-18] u. S. research 
and development must not only look to the near term 
development of next generation weapon systems to defeat the 
future threat, but it must also be "partnered" with the U.S. 
defense industry in cooperative programs designed to support 
the defense sectors where U.S. dominance is desired. 
As weapon systems become more sophisticated in the 
future, the capability of the subsystems will become more 
crucial. For example, the Joint Strike Fighter (JSF) 
involves technological advances in navigation, fire control, 
composite "stealth" materials and many other areas. 
Improvements in manufacturing technology will reduce costs 
and increase performance through the use of robotics and 
micro-circuit designs. Instead of devoting scarce military 
R&D funding to all the areas (components/subsystems), DOD 
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and the defense industrial base should look to the 
commercial sector for potential spin-off technologies. [Ref 
16: pp. 18 - 25] 
E. SUMMARY 
This chapter has shown that offsets are a way of life 
and are rapidly becoming a condition of sale in most 
international arms agreements. Countries will continue to 
require offsets for various strategic and economic reasons. 
Strategically, 
build their 
countries want to gain new technologies and 
own defense industry infrastructure. 
Economically, countries use offsets to enter new markets, 
create jobs and to acquire new commercial and military 
technologies. 
The negative impact of offsets has been minimal. 
Monitoring and administration of the program has been 
difficult, but overall they have not had a negative impact 
on particular programs or the u.S. economy. [Ref 14: p. 2] 
On the positive side, offsets have increased 
competition, overall defense business, and rationalization 
standardization and interoperability (RSI). The increase in 
the number of countries producing arms or subsystems, 
coupled with shrinking u.S. military budgets and an 
increasingly competitive market, make it evident that 
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"transnational" cooperation in arms development and 
production is necessary to maintain the core capabilities 
within the U.S. defense industrial base. [Ref 14: pp.1-3] 
Defense company officials openly state that without 
offsets, most export sales would not be made and the 
posi tive effects of these exports on the U. S. economy and 
defense industrial base would be lost. [Ref 14: pp. 1-2] 
Chapter IV looks at the data collected and the findings 
associated with a survey sent to five of the largest defense 
contractors. The survey was intended to solicit ideas and 
concerns about current FMS policy as it relates to the 
preservation of the defense industrial base. 
data, a thorough analysis is presented. 
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Following the 
IV. DA~A PRESENTATION AND ANALYSIS 
A. INTRODUCTION 
This chapter presents and discusses the data collected 
concerning FMS policy as it relates to the preservation of 
the Defense Industrial Base. Data were collected using 
archi val research coupled with a survey which was sent to 
five of the top ten major defense contractors. 
is provided in Appendix A. 
The survey 
This chapter is divided into two sections. First, the 
data collected from the surveys are presented. Second, this 
chapter presents an analysis of the information and data 
introduced in this chapter and previous chapters. 
B. DATA COLLECTION 
The survey in Appendix A was utilized as the framework 
to collect pertinent data for this thesis. The questions 
were left open-ended, to promote responses which would lead 
to meaningful issues for further discussions. The 
participants were informed as to the nature of the study. 
Some participants were unable to complete all survey 
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questions due to company policy concerning certain- types of 
data. 
Participants in the surveys provided, in some cases, 
rather frank and personal views in answering the questions. 
In order to provide a degree of anonymity to the 
respondents, the presentation format for the data collected 
from the surveys will not reference the respondents, but 
will present all answers received for each question. Since 
surveys were used, exact statements will be presented. 
Each question from the survey is listed followed by the 
answers received and -a summary. Answers are in no 
particular order. 
1. What percentage of production 1ines in your 
company are strict1y commercia1? What percentage 
are for u.s. Defense? What percentage are 
strict1y FMS? What percentage are U.S. Defense 
and commercia1? u.s. Defense and FMS? 




u.s. Defense and Commercial--75% 
u.s. Defense and FMS--85% 
All combined--100% 
• Commercial--Approximately 15% 
u.s. Defense--Approximately 50% 
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FMS--Approximately 35% 
u.s. Defense and commercial--Approximately 65% 
u.s. Defense and FMS--Approximately 85% 
All combined-IOO% 
• Majority of production lines are primarily u.s. 
defense and are augmented by FMS and Foreign 
Commercial contracts. Most recent years "business 
mix": u.s. Defense--66% Commercial-34% 89%-
domestic and 11%--international 
• Currently contractor has a 70-30 split of work. 
Contractor's commercial workload has continuously 
increased as the military work has been decreasing. 
**At particular site the majority of components 
produced will be for FMS. 
Summary: The average for FMS was almost 25%. Of note, 
this figure is much larger when looking at FMS and u.s. 
Defense--slightly over 80%. 
2. If EMS unique production lines were eliminated, 
what would be the impact on your company and your 
ability to respond to u.S. surge requirements? 
• Contractor does not have any FMS unique production 
lines. 
• Company has few FMS unique production lines. The 
ability to surge is dependent upon material input, 
tool capacity and human resources. Having an 
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operating production line with the attendant supply 
chain and human resources provides a base from which 
to surge. In the majority of cases of the company, 
DOD contracts provide that base. In some few cases 
exclusive FMS contracts provide the base. 
• There are no unique production lines for FMS. If 
FMS business were eliminated, certain aerospace 
production lines would close and the economic 
viability of some programs would be poor-
uncompetitive. 
• With some products, FMS is the main or sole 
purchaser. Without FMS, in these cases, surge 
capability would be impacted as the production lines 
would likely be dormant or eliminated. 
Summary: Overall responses indicate that there are few 
FMS unique production lines. It seems, however, for 
those that do exist, surge capability would not exist 
without FMS keeping certain production lines open. 
Certain programs would not continue to operate without 
FMS cases. 
3. Are FMS ar.ms sales making up 







• Yes, but not at the same rate of "loss" due to U. S. 
budget declines. 
• Yes, direct FMS sales have kept the production lines 
open. The lines are not unique to FMS. 
• In general, FMS has fallen as well. Without 
reviewing market studies I would venture that FMS 
reductions are proportional to DOD reductions. Many 
of the geo-poli tical factors· that affect the U. S·. 
are the same as with our FMS partners. 
Summary: Overall it seems FMS has fallen, very similar 
to the U.S. Defense budget. The end of the Cold War 
has caused a world-wide reduction in arms production 
and purchases. Direct sales may be an answer to keep 
some FMS production lines open. 
4. What has been the impact of post-Cold war 
drawdowns and changes in overall military strategy 
on your company? Please be specific. 
• The post-Cold War ·era has forced dramatic changes at 
the company. In general, it has led to tremendous 
consolidation of the defense industry. In order to 
remain competitive in this environment, the company 
has changed its strategic focus from a principal 
builder of aircraft and aerostructures to an 
electronic systems and integration house. The 
company has strategically positioned itself through 
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a number of acquisitions which have improved its 
information technology capabilities. These 
acquisi tions have allowed the company to grow in 
these fiercely competitive times. 
• Military budget has decreased causing a swing of 
activity to commercial aerospace business. (70-30 ) 
split) Long term effect-causes critical shortages 
to support field in long lead times. 
• Increased mergers and acquisitions to achieve market 
share and critical mass. 
• Increased emphasis on international markets. 
• Reductions in sales, earnings and employment are 
down by 60%. We are at or near minimum size to 
maintain technical competencies. We are clearly not 
doing advanced development at former levels. This 
has created problems with obsolescence and 
diminishing manufacturing sources (DMS). 
Summary: The consensus is that post-Cold War drawdowns 
have hurt the defense industry from a sales and 
employment perspective. Mergers have kept some firms 
competitive. International sales are sought to make-up 
for U.S. defense reductions. 
5. Have the recent military drawdowns and reductions 
in DOD budgets affected your company's ability to 
respond to defense surge requirements? If so, 
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please elaborate on certain shortfalls on your 
company's ability to respond. If not, what 
actions are you taking to mitigate this impact on 
your capabilities? 
• Since the budget reduction, contractors are using 
"just in time inventory". Late procurement of long 
lead items has increased the number of requests for 
accelerated delivery on contracts. The contractor 
can no longer advance release for raw material to 
shorten the cycle time when the contractor may not 
be issued the procurement. 
• Current surge capabilities not affected as 
consolidation has provided means to surge. Budget 
reductions have provided some additional excess 
capacity to surge as well. 
• The drawdowns have affected industry's ability to 
surge. Supplier resources and human resources have 
adjusted to the market factors. Just as many 
suppliers have withdrawn from the industry, so has a 
workforce that took a generation to build. With 
unemployment at all time lows, a large surge 
requirement would be very difficult to staff with 
qualified workers. 
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• Had tooling and supplier base for 18-20 aircraft a 
year. We now have capability for 8 per year. We 
had a large percentage of our co-producers, tooling 
and major suppliers business base. This reduction 
in number of aircraft being produced has caused us 
to become the smaller percent of their business 
base. 
Summary: Drawdowns have affected defense industry's 
ability to surge. Reduced funding has led to increased 
cost to carry inventory and a reduction in the supplier 
base. In some instances excess capacity does exist, 
but the ability to "staff" those lines with qualified 
workers would' be difficult. 
6. What role do offsets play in the conduct of FMS 
cases as they pertain to your company and the 
industry as a whole? How are they beneficial or 
detr~ental to your company? Please provide 
examples. 
• Offset commitments have become a standard 
requirement for U. S. defense contractors for both 
FMS and commercial sales of military equipment 
and/or services. There are very few countries 
around the world (the u.s. being the maj or 
exception) that do not require some level of offset. 
In fact, in many countries, offset is now considered 
one of the major selection criteria, along with 
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technical, price/financing, and political in their 
evaluations. In selected countries, offset has even 
become their top selection priority. 
• We have been able to identify and place long-term 
contracts with foreign companies that are low cost, 
quality suppliers. This has positively impacted our 
abili ty to provide a quality product at a lower 
cost. 
• Detrimental: Offsets increase the overall 
product/program cost to our foreign customer. 
• Offsets have become a condition of sale in most 
maj or FMS cases. In order for a country to gain 
internal political approval for the purchase of a 
major weapon system, champions of the purchase must 
be able to justify to all constituents the large 
outflow of dollars. The company has significant 
experience in offsets, industrial participation and 
countertrade. We view offsets as a competitive 
discriminator and an opportunity to differentiate 
ourselves and products in a highly competitive 
market. As long as a country has industrial 
objectives and resources, we are willing to promote 
an offset agreement in support of the sale. 
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• Some countries require offsets as a condition of 
sale. Therefore, companies must enter into offset 
agreements directly with certain countries to 
consummate FMS or direct commercial sales. Offsets 
are beneficial in the sense that they support the 
generation of sales. They are detrimental in that 
they create an obligation that must be satisfied and 
include terms that create financial and political 
liabilities. 
• There is increasing demand for offsets as a 
condition to the sale. There is an increasing 
demand for offsets that provide technology transfer, 
that exceed value of purchase, that require 
development of new business ventures, etc. 
• FMS offsets assist the contractor in keeping product 
lines open. 
Summary: It seems offsets are a part of almost every 
FMS case. In some instances the offsets were more 
important than price or financing. While offsets do 
keep production lines open and assist in consummating 
deals, they do create future obligations with possible 
political and financial ramifications. 
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7. What percentage of your FMS cases have associated 
offset obligations? 
• No information available at this time. 
• Approximately 100%. 
• 95-100%. While the customer may have an offset 
policy, a particular FMS sales contract may be so 
small it does not meet the country's minimum 
procurement amount to require an offset commitment. 
As an example, Kuwait does not require offset on 
defense procurements of less than $1 million Kuwaiti 
Dinars or approximately $3.25 million (U. S. 
dollars) . 
• Virtually all °maj or contracts that we are party to 
have offset obligations. The percentage of the 
obligation range from 30% to 100%. 
• Approximately 66% to 75%. 
Summary: The consensus is that offsets are a condition 
of sale and are found in a1most every FMS case. 
8. Would you say recent defense drawdowns and the 
reduced DOD budget has hurt small business 
subcontractors? To what extent has this impacted 
the subcontractors you use? What can the 
Government do to assist small businesses in 
obtaining subcontracts? What strategies can they 
,use for survival? 
• Recent drawdowns and reduced budget have impacted 
small businesses. The company has relied on small 
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businesses to supply them with a wide variety of 
product and services. Small businesses ' ability to 
react quickly to requirements has allowed the 
contractor to respond to customer needs in a timely 
manner and remain in the competitive jet market. 
• The uncertainty of the DOD budget continues . 
Funding for most weapon programs have been reduced 
with very few programs receiving increases. 
Existing programs are winding down and in most 
cases, new contracts are not replacing the completed 
contracts. Reduction has resulted in consolidation 
of large prime contractors. For the small 
businesses, the reduction in program funding has 
meant in many cases the demise of small firms. For 
those that survive, it means a much keener control 
over costs and· operations in order to compete for 
the limited available program dollars. These are 
the same dollars that the large businesses will also 
be competing for. Some subcontractors have found it 
more profitable to manufacture titanium golf shafts 
than jet engine parts. 
• Yes, DOD budget reductions have hurt small business 
subcontractors. The number of subcontractors we use 
has been reduced by 60% and some will disappear. 
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Subcontractors now must win commercial business. 
Being commercial requires being very price 
competitive and in many cases has meant making 
FMS/U.S. Defense business a lower priority. The 
Government can help more businesses in the industry 
by increased Government spending. The Government 
could help by allowing more international business. 
Drawdowns have affected the entire industry. . Not 
only have the prime contractors consolidated but 
many suppliers have withdrawn from the defense 
business due ·to decreasing opportunities and 
increasing competition. Additionally, the decrease 
in the commercial market production of 1992--1996 
exacerbated the reduction in the supplier base. 
When the commercial market turned around and 
increased demand in 1997, there was not enough 
capaci ty in the supplier base. This resulted in 
unprecedented part shortages in support of one 
company's commercial aircraft. If a military surge 
requirement were placed on top of existing demand, 
Government intervention would be required to ensure 
that military requirements received first priority. 
In order to preserve a base of small business 
suppliers, the Government needs to continually 
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eliminate military standards and move toward 
commercial practices to help reduce overhead and 
buy-in costs for small businesses. 
Summary: The small subcontractor base has definitely 
decreased due to DOD budget reductions. Large prime 
contractors have fewer subcontractors available for 
"partnering". It is essential that small 
subcontractors look to commercial markets to survive. 
The ability to surge production has been affected by 
the reduction in the number of small subcontractors. 
The Government can help by ensuring a certain amount of 
budget dollars are awarded to small subcontractors and 
move toward more commercial practices and standards. 
9. What are your current concerns about EMS policy as 
they relate to your company and the Defense 
Industrial Base? 
• The foreign release policy is one of the largest 
factors affe~ting FMS programs. Weapon system 
sophistication and technology as opposed to the 
number of weapons that can be purchased per monetary 
unit, are becoming increasingly critical to 
international buyers. Over the years overseas 
competitors have increased their technology 
offerings so that now many are on par with U. S. 
systems. This will increase their international 
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competitiveness resulting in a reduction in the u.s. 
product market share. 
• FMS policy is too rigid and costly when compared to 
other countries' policies on military sales. The 
process is time consuming, inflexible to customer 
needs and costly when considering the u.s. 
Government "taxes" added to the manufacturer's 
price. 
• FMS policy has not adjusted to the United States' 
need for sales versuS' long standing dedication to 
implementing Foreign Policy. FMS policy is costly, 
restrictive and unnecessary. FMS policy is in 
immediate need of an overhaul to permit more hybrid 
commercial/FMS sales. FMS processes and practices, 
as well as advocacy, vary between Services. 
• The shrinking of the overall Defense Industrial Base 
will ultimately increase prices to FMS and domestic 
customers. 
Summary: International competition is on the rise. 
Respondents feel FMS policy is costly and inflexible. 
FMS policy has not "adapted" to changes in u.S. Foreign 
Policy nor to changes in the international arms market. 
Foreign Policy is taking precedence over FMS policies 
which is restricting major defense firms. 
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10. Do current u. S. EMS defense policies promote or 
hinder ar.ms transfers and EMS sales? If so, what 
specific policies do you find beneficial or 
detrimental to your company? 
• Hinder, FMS credit funding levels need to be 
created. The approved country list needs to be 
expanded. Technology releaseability policies and 
follow-on support are too restrictive. 
• R&D recoupment is detrimental. With less weapons 
production, industry has looked to R&D and 
maintenance/repair as ways to remain profitable. 
u.s. Government added costs are detrimental. 
• Relaxation of the arms transfer and FMS sales 
policy, although good for DOD may ultimately be 
detrimental to the warfighter. An enemy could 
become armed with our technology. 
• FMS policies are important for the control of 
technology. It preserves the United States' right 
to critical technology and allows the U.S. to 
exercise varying levels of control over the 
technology that it exports. In some cases this 
allows the u.S. to exert control over non-
cooperating partners through its control of the 
supply chain. FMS policies both promote and hinder 
arms sales. On one hand, they carry the endorsement 
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and assurances of the u. S. Government and on the 
other hand they impose limitations and add cost to 
the offerings. 
Summary: FMS creates a great responsibility to control 
the diffusion of technology. Respondents generally 
agree that relaxing the arms transfer process can have 
both negative and positive results. One respondent was 
very adamant that FMS policy· hinders the defense 
industry and revisions are necessary to facilitate 
future FMS cases. 
11. What additional steps can the Government take to 
assist your company in the establishment of FMS 
cases? 
• No Comments'. 
• Retain the International Traffic in Arms Regulation 
(ITAR) but overhaul. the FMS system. 
• The export license process is one of the most 
cumbersome aspects.of international sales and has a 
lot of room for streamlining. The rules are complex 
and leave a lot of room for interpretation. They 
are not consistent from case to case. Approvals 
take 90 days to six months and take a lot of time 
and manpower to prepare. Licenses are inflexible to 
changes without going through a lengthy amendment 
process. In general it hinders u.s. companies' 
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ability to respond to the market as quickly as 
today's market changes. 
• Companies wish to develop a partnership with 
industry to address the market place and to allow 
for direct commercial sales in lieu of FMS. 
Summary: Respondents believe the FMS system is in need 
of some changes. Several company representatives 
recommended direct sales and more reliance on the ITAR 
as possible solutions. Overall consensus is that rules 
are rigid and the approval process is time-consuming 
and expensive. 
C. ANALYSIS OF SURVEY DATA 
1. Impact of EMS on U.S. Defense Industry. 
The respondents to the survey reported that FMS 
comprises anywhere from 25% to 30% of their total sales. 
Wi th the inclusion of u. S. Defense sales, those numbers 
increase to approximately 70-80%. The Cold War is indeed 
over, but major defense firms still rely on defense related 
FMS products and services. The overall numbers approximate 
what was expected, but it was thought FMS would comprise an 
even larger percentage of overall sales. The researcher's 
hypothesis was based on information that indicates overall 
u.S. Defense spending has declined in recent years. This, 
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coupled with recent defense mergers, led the researcher to 
believe FMS was increasingly important to overall company 
survival. 
When respondents were asked about FMS unique production 
lines and their impact on the company's "bottom-line", the 
responses were surprising. Not one company would openly 
admi t certain production lines were solely, for FMS cases. 
In reality, many u.s. weapon systems now being built-
including most F-15 and F-16 fighters, M-1 tanks and AH-64 
helicopter gunships-are bound for foreign countries. Today, 
only two major defense contractors produce fighter aircraft 
in the U. S. -Boeing/McDonnell Douglas and Lockheed-Martin. 
FMS is a big reason why these two contractors are still in 
the fighter business. The last F-16 produced for the u.s. 
Air Force (USAF) was delivered in 1997 (FY-94 procurement); 
Lockheed-Martin will continue producing them for FMS 
countries through ' the turn of the century. For 
Boeing/McDonnell Douglas, the USAF has already received its 
last F-15Es. Foreign procurements will keep these 
production lines operational through the end of the decade. 
Since these production lines are still viable, the 
opportunity does exist for the USAF to restart new 
production without exorbitant start-up costs. In FY-95, the 
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USAF did issue a request to purchase 120 F-16Cs and 18 F-
15Es to maintain its present level of fighter wings into the 
next century. This would not have been feasible if FMS had 
not kept these production lines active. [Ref 30: pp. 24-25] 
It is important to consider that nearly all production 
lines for present fighter aircraft and all lines for tanks 
will be ending in the near future (except for the follow-on 
F/A-18E/F model aircraft). Follow-on.systems such as the F~ 
22 and Joint Strike Fighter (JSF) are still three or more 
years off due to stockpiled weapon systems, the lack of a 
viable threat and reduced procurement dollars. DOD, 
however, is beginning to recogni ze the importance of U. S. 
production lines with their inherent technological 
processes, and it is taking steps to preserve this portion 
of the defense industrial base. Sales of the F-15E to Saudi 
Arabia and Israel are excellent examples of this type of 
preservation. The McDonnell Douglas F-15 was about to go 
out of production until sales were made to Saudi Arabia in 
the mid-1990s. [Ref 13: pp. 21-23] 
Further examination of data show that surge 
requirements can be met by operating production lines from 
present DOD contracts, and in a few cases, from exclusive 
FMS contracts. There should be some short-term surge 
capability, medium-term expansion capability, and long-term 
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reconstitution capability in the U.S. Defense Industrial 
Base. These jobs cannot be started up over night. If 
production lines are closed, important defense workers lose 
their jobs, subcontractors move into different businesses, 
and many suppliers go out of business, never to be found in 
time of need. If the u.s. Defense Industrial Base is unable 
to provide adequate spares for fighter aircraft and armor 
weapon systems in our inventory, the U.S. military will have 
a very difficult time fighting any prolonged conflict. 
In response to Question 3, 
answers. One contractor states 
for production losses due to 
respondents have different 
"no", FMS has not made up 
budget reductions. Two 
respondents feel FMS was helping to "offset" the losses, but 
not at the same rate of losses due to reductions in the 
domestic budget. One respondent claims FMS has fallen as 
well (as the budget) due to world-wide political factors. 
Competition 
contractors. 
has arisen from international defense 
Our coalition partners and allies want next 
generation equipment. If they don't get it from the U.S., 
they will get it from someone else. The u.s. weapons-market 
share briefly increased after the Cold War at the expense of 
its competitors. Between 1986-89 and 1990-93, the value of 
Great Britain's exports shrank seventy-six percent, while 
Russian and Chinese exports fell sixty-eight percent. Over 
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the same time span, the value of United Sates contracts 
climbed 134 percent. Presently, exports world-wide have 
fallen. With the end of the Cold War many countries are 
looking to re-shape their economies and enter new markets 
(technology/pharmaceuticals) as the world heads into the 
21 st century. [Ref 26:pp. 1-4] 
2. The Impact of DOD Drawdowns on the Defense 
Industry, Surge Capabilities and the Small 
Subcontractor. 
Questions 4, 5 and 8 deal with the impact of DOD 
drawdowns on the defense industry, surge capabilities and 
small business subcontractors. Overall responses to these 
questions are in line with researcher expectations. Defense 
firms have focused on mergers and consolidations to remain 
viable. Acquisitions have .been- vital to company stability. 
Defense firms have used the mergers to maintain market 
share. An essential question is whether or not U.S. defense 
firms, despite the significant decline in defense 
procurements, remain capable of satisfying weapon system 
requirements to support foreign policy. 
In response to surge capability, one respondent answers 
that the increased use of just-in-time inventory has led to 
a reduction in advance purchases of raw materials. The prime 
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contractor is presently unable to maintain a large inventory 
of supplies, a situation which can lead to increased cycle 
time for procurements. Another respondent emphatically 
states that the ability to produce aircraft has been reduced 
more than 50%. No longer does it maintain the tooling and 
supplier base necessary for surge requirements. One 
respondent focuses on the fact that the defense industry is 
not simply a few large contractors working exclusively to 
supply weapon systems to DOD. While there are some cases 
in which only a single supplier of a particular system 
exists, such suppliers typically employ 800 to 1,000 
subcontractors, who contribute about 60% of the value of 
delivered systems.· Supplier and human resources have 
declined and a workforce that took the better part of the 
20th century to build has been lost. Only one respondent 
feels current surge capabilities have not been affected. 
This individual strongly feels budget reductions provide the 
excess capacity necessary for surge requirements. 
Based on overall survey data, this researcher feels 
surge requirements involve doubling or even tripling the 
output of certain weapon systems. Excess line capacity 
alone is not sufficient to meet these needs. 
Retooling/refitting and training (personnel) may be 
necessary to meet the Government's needs. 
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In answering Question 8 of the survey, respondents 
overwhelmingly agree that defense drawdowns have negatively 
impacted small business subcontractors. These losses have 
greatly affected surge requirements because small businesses 
can react quickly to unique procurements. Small business 
subcontractors have developed a variety of strategies to 
compensate for the defense drawdown. Many have simply left 
the defense industry completely. Others, including pr~me 
contractors, have reduced their defense operations. Some 
companies have diversified into the commercial sector so 
they can maintain a lower level of defense production. With 
numerous base closures, certain services have prospered, for 
example, environmental clean-up, warehousing and facilities 
related services have increased. [Ref 20: pp. 20-21] The 
adoption of commercial standards is a possible solution to 
assist small businesses reduce their overhead and start-up 
costs. Overall, many respondents recommend increased 
funding for small businesses and a move to commercial 
practices as possible solutions to the reductions in the 
small business supplier base. 
The Bush Administration had hoped to let market forces 
pare down the size of the U.S. defense industry; Its 
policies were designed to allow market forces, rather than 
int~rvention, subsidies, or protection, produce the 
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strongest foundation for future defense needs. The policy 
was criticized by defense experts, charging that the free 
market is motivated primarily by short-term profit and would 
not have any regard for the importance of long-term 
investment or for the country's national security needs. 
Today, the Clinton Administration hopes to assist the 
defense industry (prime and small subcontractors) by 
developing long-term national security interests. and 
improving u.s. economic competitiveness worldwide. [Ref 15: 
p. 3] 
3. Ro1e of Offsets 
Questions 6 and 7 address offsets, their prevalence in 
export sales, and the role they play in the conduct of FMS 
cases. When this thesis began, the researcher had divided 
views on offsets. On one hand, offsets are seen as an 
unavoidable part of doing business overseas. On the other 
hand, offsets can negatively affect the defense industry and 
other u.s. interests. Specifically in Question 6, 
respondents claim that there is an increasing demand for 
offsets and most companies feel compelled to enter into 
offset agreements to consummate a FMS case. Respondents do 
point out, however, that offsets also create obligations 
that must be satisfied in the future that can become a 
political, as well as financial, liability. Most agree that 
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offsets are beneficial when assisting companies to gain or 
maintain a foreign customer base. One respondent even 
points out that most offset costs are recoverable and 
regulated by the DOD FAR Supplement (DFARS) for each FMS 
case. Views on the impact of offsets on the U.S economy as 
well as specific defense industries are difficult to 
establish without reliable data. The Department of Commerce 
is currently gathering information on the impact of offsets 
and is expected to issue a report in late 1998-early 1999. 
The General Accounting Office (GAO) reports that actual 
offset incidence is approximately seventy percent. [Ref 14: 
p. 2 ] 
Those surveyed in this study felt offsets can also be 
detrimental because they increase overall product/program 
costs. An additional 3%-5% for offset plus a 5% U.S. 
Government administration fee for FMS can make a proposed 
program unaffordable to potential foreign customers. 
Respondents also state that offsets require a company to 
commit significant overhead resources (financial and 
manpower) to identify and develop offset program proposals 
in support of FMS sales campaigns (these are non-recoverable 
costs) . 
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As indicated by responses to Question 7, prevalence of 
offsets in FMS cases is clearly evident. Respondents 
overwhelmingly state that virtually all major contracts have 
offset obligations. On average, respondents stated, 
approximately 85% of all FMS cases have associated offset 
requirements (GAO 1996 report states 70%). 
It is obvious that there is difficulty in accurately 
measuring the impact of offsets on the overall u.s. economy 
and individual sectors of the defense industry. The data 
show that overall, company ·officials feel that without 
offsets, most export sales would not be made and the 
positive effects of these exports on the U.S. defense 
industrial base would be lost. Offsets help foreign buyers 
build public support for purchasing U. S. products, 
especially since weapon procurement often involves- the 
expendi ture of large amounts of public monies on imported 
systems. Other company officials indicate that export sales 
provide employment for the U. S. defense industry and help 
reduce unit costs to the U. S. military. Respondents also 
note that many offset deals create new and profitable 
business opportunities for themselves and other companies. 
Some examples include the United Arab Emirates paying a U.S. 
law firm to draft the country's environmental laws. They 
also contracted with McDonnell-Douglas for a product that 
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cleans up oils spills. The United Arab Emirates is also 
working with Chase Manhattan to establish an off-shore 
investment fund. Some company officials comment that 
indirect offsets make more sense for countries than defense-
related offsets. Overall, u.S. companies feel they are able 
to meet offset demands. [Ref 14: pp. 6-7] 
As the researcher concludes this area of analysis, it 
seems the positive affects of offsets may outweigh negative 
concerns. 
4. Current Industry Concerns 
Questions 9, 10 and 11 examine current concerns 
and future recommendations concerning FMS policy. ' The 
respondents' comments are in line with the researcher's 
thoughts on the rigidity of FMS policy. Respondents believe 
FMS policy overall is time consuming and inflexible--
exactly what is depicted in Chapter II. Respondents also 
feel a "new" system, which permits more commercial and 
direct sales, should be implemented. The researcher is 
actually surprised that two respondents express concern 
about technology transfer and the impact it could have on 
the American "warfighter". While mOst respondents speak 
from an industrial point of view, there are comments that 
advocate tight controls that safeguard critical technology. 
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Respondents generally agree that the u.s. has the 
military equipment and services of choice, but due to policy 
constraints many countries are unable to acquire it. 
Controls make it difficult for most countries to even be 
permitted to purchase u.s. weapon systems. Overall 
respondents feel restrictions must be reduced so the defense 
industrial base can remain strong. This researcher agrees 
controls are necessary, but certain concessions can be made 
to assist the defense industry. 
Question 11 asks for specific recommendations and steps 
the Government can take to assist in the establishment of 
FMS cases. One respondent states that the export license 
process is cumbersome and in need of streamlining. This is 
a new point brought out to the researcher and one the 
Government should examine. Another respondent sums it up 
nicely when he states "a partnership with industry to 
address the market place and to allow for direct commercial 
sales in lieu of FMS" is needed. 
It is true u.s. defense contractors may sell directly 
to a foreign buyer under the u.s. ITAR with the approval of 
the Office of Munitions Control (OMC). Any company that 
manufactures or exports defense articles or services is 
required to register with OMC. OMC in return coordinates 
the request for permission to export defense articles and 
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services. A license must be granted by OMC before defense 
articles may be exported. If there is any doubt about 
issuing an export license, it is sent to the State 
Department for review. After approval by respective 
Government offices, OMC requires the receiving country to 
sign an end user certificate, and the export license is 
issued. [Ref 22:pp. 23-24] The entire process just 
described can be very time consuming and if not approved, 
prevent the conduct of FMS cases. 
D. SUMMARY 
This chapter presents data collected from a survey, and 
an analysis of those survey data and the information 
presented in previous chapters. The survey was utilized to 
gather data from five major defense companies. The 
questions and data were grouped into four topic areas and 
analyzed along with other information presented in Chapters 
II and III. 
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v . CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
A. CONCLUSIONS 
Since the late 1980's, the DOD budget has sharply 
declined. This decline has translated into fewer DOD 
procurement dollars which in turn nas affected the U. S. 
Defense Industrial Base. The U.S. Government can preserve 
the Defense Industrial Base by aggressively supporting U.S. 
defense firms in Foreign Military Sales. Arms transfers 
will continue to be an instrument of foreign policy. The 
stringent controls in the arms transfer decision-making 
process, however, must be streamlined to reflect current 
security and economic concerns. 
As a result of the research, the following conclusions 
have been drawn. Their sequence does not signify any order 
of priority or preference. 
1. The decision-making process of the president, the 
Department of State, DOD and other governmental agencies is 
stifling EMS cases. There are too many rules and 
regulations, as well as political restraints, that force 
many nations to go elsewhere for their arms requirements. 
The loss of sales has hurt the defense industry. The U.S. 
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is in a position to maintain market share and assist the 
defense industry by easing the rules and regulations. u.S. 
export controls can be enhanced by developing a shared 
database of export items, buyers and end-users that pose a 
proliferation risk. The approved countries list must be 
updated periodically to reflect current foreign policy. 
2. Foreign governments wi11 continue to require offset 
agreements as a condition of sa1e. Offsets are considered 
an important competitive tool for u.S. defense contractors. 
While some argue offsets are illegal or immoral, they are 
nothing more than a way of engaging in a reciprocal trade 
agreement. The results of this study suggest that tne u.S. 
must retain control over technology processes, but not on 
the sale of technological products. 
3. The export 1icense process must be 1ibera1ized in 
DOD. The Department of Commerce has reduced controls in 
export procedures. In the mid-1980's, approximately 120,000 
licenses were reviewed annually. In 1994, only 16,000 
licenses were reviewed which allowed for the rapid 
establishment of FMS cases [Ref 5:pp 65-69] . Such 
streamlining can also be applied to DOD. Presently, 
approvals. take anywhere from ninety days to six months and a 
lot of time and manpower is exerted to prepare a case. 
Licenses are inflexible to changes and go through a lengthy 
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amendment process. In general the export license process 
hinders U.S. companies' ability to respond to the market as 
quickly as today's market changes. 
4. Most major weapon system production lines will be 
ending in the near future. Proposed follow-on systems such 
as the Joint Strike Fighter (JSF) and F-22 Raptor are years 
away from fielding due to a reduced defense budget and the 
lack of a viable threat. The number of programs that are 
available for FMS is decreasing. It is doubtful whether the 
JSF and F-22 will be made available for FMS due to their 
advanced technology and stealth architecture. 
5. EMS sales are not making up for overall production 
losses due to the shrinkfng U.S. military budget. Since the 
end of the Cold War, FMS sales have fallen as well. Defense 
firms surveyed feel FMS reductions have been proportional to 
DOD reductions. 
B. RECOMMENDATIONS 
Maintaining America's military strength requires a 
strong defense industrial base that can produce a sufficient 
number of modern weapons to sustain the U. S Armed Forces 
during combat. The present administration risks undermining 
the industrial base through defense budget reductions that 
are too deep and too focused on decreasing procurement 
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budgets for major weapon systems and in turn the opportunity 
for FMS cases. America's soldiers, sailors and.airmen could 
pay a high price in future conflicts as a result of this 
policy. The following recommendations should be considered: 
• Direct sales should be adopted in instances where 
foreign policy dictates. The approved countries 
list for FMS should be updated periodically to 
reflect present foreign policy. The Cold War is 
indeed over and our FMS policy should reflect the 
changes seen in the international community. 
• FMS cases should be tailored like all other 
acquisition strategies. Outdated templates should 
be abandoned in order to stream-line FMS controls. 
Each case should be handled individually which will 
reduce waiting time and associated cost. If we do 
not liberalize our FMS controls, our closest allies 
will take their business elsewhere. 
• The Government should use commercial specifications 
to a greater extent. With this policy, there would 
be less additional set-up and developmental costs 
for defense firms. The defense industry would be 
able to not only fulfill its military orders, but 
also look to the civilian sector for business. This 
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policy would not only benefit major defense firms, 
but also small business subcontractors. 
• The defense industry must maintain a surge capacity. 
Surge requirements can be met by existing production 
lines from DOD contracts, and in a few cases, from 
exclusive FMS contracts (F-15, F-16 & M-l). There 
must be a short-term surge capacity, medium-term 
expansion capability, and long-term reconstitution 
capability in the u.s. Defense Industrial Base. 
High-technology weapon systems cannot be started up 
over night. When production lines close, important 
defense skills are lost and many suppliers go out of 
business. 
• The Government should broaden the procurement base 
which requires a shift away from a mind-set and 
acquisition system designed for Cold War defense. 
Reducing barriers to entry would attract ci vilian-
oriented companies to the military market. A policy 
shift from reliance on a tightly controlled defense 
industrial base to a broader national industrial 
base, serving defense and civilian sectors, should 
be adopted. 
• The U. S. Government should enhance the 
competitiveness of u.s. industry abroad by 
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facilitating market position in the international 
marketplace. u.S. technology transfer and security 
policies should shift from a protectionist stance to 
one that supports industry-to-industry cooperation. 
This policy must balance guarding u.S. critical 
military technologies with addressing foreign policy 
issues such as arms proliferation. Such technology 
and foreign policy goals should be identified and 
supported. [Ref 27: pp. 2-5J 
The challenge for the United States is to harness the 
economic growth capacity of new technologies and industries 
to remain the world's premiere power. The productive and 
technological base remains a firm foundation of national 
power against which a number of instruments, including 
military power, may be leveraged to influence world events. 
The U. S. 
support. 
Defense Industrial Base requires aggressive 
The challenge can be met by supporting u.s. 
defense firms in the arms transfer process while at the same 
time controlling the spread of technological processes. 
Streamlining the labyrinth of controls associated with FMS 
can help maintain the defense industrial base, and keep it 
viable as an integral part of national strategy. 
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C. SUMMARY OF RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
In order to accomplish the obj ecti ves of this study, 
the following research questions were pursued. 
1. Primary Research Question. Does current FMS policy 
hinder or facilitate the preservation of the United States 
defense industrial base? 
As identified and discussed in Chapter IV, there are 
various feelings about this question. The defense industry 
seems to believe FMS policies are important for the control 
of technology. Relaxing arms transfer policy would be good 
for industry, but could be detrimental to U.S. servicemen. 
Companies agree present policy must be streamlined to 
facili tate FMS cases. The approved country list must be 
expanded and technological releaseability policies should be 
reviewed. 
2. Secondary Research Question #1. What is the purpose 
of EMS? 
Section 516 of the Foreign Assistance Act authorizes 
the transfer of defense articles to members of NATO, non-
NATO members on the southern flank of NATO, and to countries 
which contributed armed forces to repel Iraqi aggression in 
the Arabian Gulf. FMS allows defense firms to export 
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approved products and services which benefit the defense 
industry and are in line with foreign policy of the u.s. 
3. Secondary Research Question #2. What current 
policies guide the conduct of EMS? 
The Arms Export Control Act (AECA) of 1976 and the 
Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, as amended, allow the 
President to delegate the authority for arms transfer 
policy. President Clinton's Conventional Arms Transfer 
Policy is designed to enhance the ability of the defense 
industry to meet u.S. defense requirements while maintaining 
long-term technological superiority at lower costs. This 
policy offers few suggestions on how t,o accomplish this and 
it continues to stress a Cold War security mentality. 
4. Secondary Research Question #3. What has been the 
impact of post-Cold War, u. S . drawdowns and changes in 
overall military strategy as it affects the defense 
industrial base? 
The declining budget has had a tremendous affect on the 
defense industrial base. The inability of the DOD to 
maintain programs and enter new procurements has led to 
large scale mergers and many companies leaving the defense 
business. Reduced funding for existing programs has 
influenced both prime and subordinate contractors. 
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5. Secondary Research Question #4. What are the roles 
of offsets in FMS and how do offsets facilitate the 
preservation of the defense industrial base? 
Offset agreements have had a positive affect in the 
area of industrial competitiveness. The success U.S. 
defense industries have had in light of offsets has been 
favorable. The positive trade balance between the U.S and 
its trading partners is indicative of the benefits flowing 
into the U.S. as a result of military exports with 
associated offset agreements. As reported by one 
respondent, some offset agreements have led to new advances 
in technology development that might be used to improve 
systems and reduce costs for the Armed Services. Offset 
arrangements are not new to military export sales and are 
often an essential part of a FMS case. 
6. Secondary Research Question #5. What are the 
current Government and industry concerns about EMS Policies 
as they relate to the defense industrial base? 
The Government feels FMS policy is important for the 
control of technology. It preserves the United States' 
right to critical technology and allows the U.S. to exercise 
varying levels of control over the technology it exports. 
The surveyed defense firms feel FMS policy has not adjusted 
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to the needs of the defense industry and current foreign 
policy. Industry states FMS is costly and restrictive. 
Further reductions in the Defense Industrial Base will 
ultimately increase defense article prices for FMS and 
domestic customers. 
D. ADDITIONAL AREAS OF RESEARCH 
This research evaluates the impact FMS policy has on 
the preservation of the u. S. Defense Industrial Base. The 
following questions warrant further research: 
1. To what extent do international arms markets affect 
the u.s. Defense Industrial Base? 
2. What impact have defense mergers had on the U. S. 
defense industry and the probability of future mergers in 
the industry? 
3. What lessons can be learned from examining a 
specific FMS case (F/A-18 or F-15) from inception to 
completion in order to document the entire process? The 
study should examine the time taken for approval, associated 
offsets and the impact that case has on the defense firm. 




1. What percentage of production lines in your company are 
strictly commercial? What percentage are for U.S. defense? 
What percentage are strictly FMS? What percentage are U.S. 
defense and commercial? U. S. defense and FMS? Commercial, 
u.S. defense and FMS combined? 
2. If FMS unique production lines were eliminated, what 
would be the impact on your company and your ability to 
respond to u.S. defense surge requirements? 
3. Are FMS sales making up for overall production "loses" 
due to the shrinking Q.S. military budget? 
4. What has been the impact of post-Cold War u.S. 
drawdowns and changes in overall military strategy on your 
company? Please be specific. 
S. Has the recent military drawdown and reductions in DOD 
budgets affected your company's ability to respond to 
defense surge requirements? If so, please elaborate on 
certain shortfalls on your company' s ability top respond. 
If not, what actions are you taking to mitigate this impact 
on your capabilities? 
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6. What role do offsets play in the conduct of FMS cases 
as they pertain to your company and industry as a whole? 
How are they beneficial or detrimental to your company? 
Please provide examples. 
7. What percentage of your FMS sales have associated 
offset obligations? 
8. Would you say recent defense drawdowns and the reduced 
DOD budget has hurt small business subcontractors? To what 
extent has this impacted the subcontractors you use? What 
can the Government do to assist small business in obtaining 
subcontracts? What strategies can they use for survival? 
9. What are your current concerns about FMS policy as they 
"relate to your company and the defense industrial base? 
10. Do current U.S. FMS defense policies promote or hinder 
arms transfers and FMS sales? If so, what specific policies 
do you find beneficial/detrimental 0 your company? 
11. What additional steps can be taken to assist your 
company in the establishment of FMS cases? 
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